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The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between ownership structure,
corporate governance, and dividend policy. The sample in this study is a financial
company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2014–2016. The results
showed that managerial ownership is positively related to dividend policy. Institutional
ownership is negatively related to dividend policy. Board size is negatively related to
dividend policy, while independent board is positively related to dividend policy.
Keywords: managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board size, independent
board
1. Introduction
The debate over dividend policy was initiated by Gordon (1959), Lintner (1956) and
Miller dan Modigliani (1961), which remains a controversial issue today. Black (1976)
in his ”The Dividend Puzzle” supported Kinkki (2001) cannot explain what a company
should do about dividend policy. Some studies offer an alternative and interesting
approach as a solution. Much of the research is rooted in information asymmetry
between insiders and outsiders as well as ownership and control structures. In agency
theory frameworks, Crutchley dan Hansen (1989) suggest one way to reduce the cost
of equity agents is by increasing dividends (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). A larger
dividend payout will increase the chances of an increase in external equity capital, so
that the activity of the manager will be monitored by the stock exchange, stock com-
missions, investment bankers, and new capital providers. This monitoring encourages
managers to act more in line with the interests of shareholders. Jensen dan Meckling
(1976) argue that conflicts between principals and agents occur because they act for
their own interests. However, unlike in developed countries, agency problems occur
between majority shareholder and minority (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al.,
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2000). Majority shareholders tend to take over minority shareholders. That is why
good corporate governance is needed to protect minority shareholders right.
There are two theories in the relationship between corporate governance and divi-
dend policy: outcome and substitution (La Porta et al., 2000). In the theory of outcome
mentioned that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance with
dividend policy (Kowalewski et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 2000). On the other hand, in
the substitution theory mentioned that the weaker corporate governance practice, the
company will provide higher dividends (Renneboog dan Szilagyi, 2006).
In Indonesia, the government has issued strong regulations in encouraging compa-
nies to implement good corporate governance. However, until this time, Indonesian
firms are still relatively weak in the implementation of good corporate governance.
In 2015, Indonesia was only able to place its two companies in the list of 50 Best
Issuers in Good Corporate Governance Practices in ASEAN in the awarding of the ASEAN
Corporate Governance Awards 2015 organized by the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum
(ACMF) in Manila, Philippines, under Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. This study
follows the recommendations of Setiawan dan Kee Phua (2013), using the financial
firm as the research sample.
2. Theoritical Review
Jensen dan Meckling (1976) argue that a conflict of interest exists between the prin-
cipal and the agent because they act for their own interests. However, in developing
countries, agency problems also occur between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, good corporate
governance mechanism is needed to protect the interests of minority shareholders,
such as dividends payment. In previous research, ownership is one of the important
variables that influences dividend payout ratio (Kumar, 2006). Managerial ownership
positively related to dividend payout ratio, while institutional ownership negatively
related to dividend payout ratio. Al-Najjar dan Kilincarslan (2016) found that insti-
tutional investors is negatively related to dividend payment, while board size has a
positive effect on dividend payment
Bokpin (2011) in his research on the Ghana Stock Exchange found that insider own-
ership, board size and independent board has a positive effect on dividend policy. Roy
(2015) found that institutional investors negatively affect dividend payout, while board
size and independent board have positive effect on dividend payout. Setiawan dan Kee
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Phua (2013) in his research found that board size was negatively related to dividend
policy
Based on the literature review that has been described previously, the hypothesis
in this study:
H1: Managerial ownership is positively related to dividend policy
H2: Institutional ownership is negatively related to dividend policy
H3: Board Size is negatively related to dividend policy
H4: The Independent Board is positively related to dividend policy
3. Research Methodology
We select our sample from financial firm that listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange that
announce dividend from 2014-2016 periods. In order to measure corporate governance
practice, we use board size and independent board. To test the hypothesis, we applies
regression analysis:
𝐷𝑃𝑅 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁+ 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏3𝐵𝑍 + 𝑏4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵 + 𝑒
1. DPR = Dividend Payout Ratio
2. MOWN = Managerial Ownership
3. INST = Institutional Ownership
4. BZ = Board size
5. INDB = Independent Board
4. Discussion
The sample in this study is a financial firm listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange which
announces dividend payment in the period of 2014-2016. The financial firm selected
as the research sample is a recommendation of previous research (Setiawan dan Kee
Phua, 2013). Financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange are 79 com-
panies, and only 27 companies are announcing dividend payment during 2014-2016.
Total observations are 81 firm-year observations. The following table presents the
descriptive statistics of this research.
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T 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Minimum Maximum Mean
MOWN 0,00 67,90 2,5148
INST 0,00 90,34 23,1544
BS 6,00 20,00 10,8395
INDB 0,14 0,40 0,2417
DPR 5,03 91,15 34,9923
Notes: n = 81; MOWN = Managerial Ownership; INST = Institutional Ownership;
BS = Board size; INDB = Independent Board; DPR = Dividend Payout
From Table I, the descriptive statistics formanagerial ownership show that the actual
range is 0% to 67,9%, with a mean of 2,5148%. This result show that the existence
of managerial ownership in the ownership structure of financial firm is very low. insti-
tutional ownership is in the range of 0% to 90.34% with a mean of 23.1544%. Board
size is in range 6 to 20, with a mean of 10,8395. Mean board size is high enough,
CEOs will be more difficult in leading and controlling councils as the number of boards
increases over 10 members. The opportunity for each individual in the council to exert
influence in decision-making becomes more limited and any meetings made become
more uncontrollable (Harper, 2007). Although, with a larger number of board members
increasing the number of expert skills and abilities of the board, it is oftenmore difficult
to coordinate because of the greater number of interactions among members (Good-
stein et al., 1994). Independent Board is in range 0,14 to 0,4, with a mean of 0,2417.
Companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange are required to have an independent board
composition of at least 30%. Companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange are required to
have an independent board composition of at least 30%. thus the average composition
of independent board in the sample company is below 30%. This shows the weak of
good corporate governance practice by companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange.
T 2: Regression Analysis.
Variable Coefficient T𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 Sig.
MOWN 0,178 1,137 0,259*
INST -0,045 -0,726 0,470*
BS -3,066 -3,070 0,003*
INDB 10,015 3,195 0,002*
Notes: * Significant 1 per cent; n = 81; MOWN = Managerial Ownership; INST
= Institutional Ownership; BS = Board size; INDB = Independent Board; DPR =
Dividend Payout
From table 2,Managerial Ownership is positively related to dividend policy (insignifi-
cant). These results confirm the findings of Kumar (2006) and Bokpin (2011), who found
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a positive correlation between managerial ownership and dividend policy. This sug-
gests that improving managerial ownership at some threshold, will make the insider
feel no more benefit to increase dividend payouts. These results support the entrench-
ment hypotheses (Fama dan Jensen, 1983). Based on this result, H1 is accepted‘
Institutional ownership is negatively related to dividend policy (insignificant). These
results also confirm the findings of Kumar (2006) and Roy (2015), who found a negative
correlation between institutional ownership and dividend policy. This is in line with the
behavior of institutional investors, as institutional investors are also the creditor of the
company, so they are very concerned to protect their credit. Based on this result, H2 is
accepted
Board size negatively correlated to dividend policy (significant at 1%). These results
confirm the findings of Setiawan dan Kee Phua (2013) who found a negative correlation
Board size and dividend policy. This shows theweak implementation of good corporate
governance in financial firm. Based on this result, H3 is accepted
Independent board is positively related to dividend policy (significant at 1%). These
results are in line with the findings of Bokpin (2011) who found a positive correlation
between Independent board and dividend policy. This indicates that an increase in
the board of independent commissioners will encourage the company to pay a larger
dividend. Based on this result, H4 is accepted
5. Conclusion
The percentage of shares owned by the manager greatly affects the payment of divi-
dends. In the Indonesian financial firms, the insider ownership is very low. This causes
managers are reluctant to make dividend payments. Statistically only 27 financial com-
panies are paying dividends throughout 2014-2016 from 79 listed financial firm in
Indonesia Stock Exchange. These results are in line with Crutchley dan Hansen (1989)
which states that an increase in the percentage of share ownership by managers, will
make managers motivated to improve performance and more responsibly improve
shareholder wealth through dividend payouts.
The low implementation of good corporate governance in Indonesia has an impact
on dividend policy in accordance with the findings of Setiawan dan Kee Phua (2013).
Indonesian financial firms tend to compensate their poor corporate governance
through higher dividend payment. There is a negative effect of board size on dividend
payment. Therefore this research confirms the application of substitution theory in
Indonesia rather than outcome theory. However, on the other hand, the existence
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of an independent board of commissioners encourages companies to make larger
dividend payments.
Limitation in this study: the number of financial companies that make dividend
payments only 34.1% of 79 companies. In the future research is recommended to
extend the time of the study, so that obtained data and better results
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